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AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1983 OPINIONS
FILED IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BETWEEN JUNE 1, 1998 AND MAY 31, 1999
George C. Pratt*
This article presents an overview of the sixty-four opinions in
cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that were written in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit during the
one year from June 1, 1998, to May 31, 1999 at the end of this
article is an alphabetical list of the cases with a brief description of
the §1983 issues decided. The article itself focuses on what kinds
of disputes are being brought to the court, who brings them, what
are the current problems in Section 1983 litigation, and how is the
Second Circuit handling these problems.
I. CASES CONSIDERED
In all of the 64 cases described and discussed here, the court
wrote formal opinions; thus, the article does not consider the large
number of section 1983 appeals that were decided by summaiy
order. (A summary order is used when the panel members believe
"that no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a written
opinion." See Section 0.23 Rules of the Second Circuit) We do
not know exactly how many such summary dispositions of section
1983 cases there were. In general, however, approximately 70% of
the court's dispositions for the fiscal year ended September 30,
1998, were by summary order. This figure is consistent with the
pattern over the past several years.
If that pattern held true for section 1983 during the period
examined here, then in addition to the 64 opinions filed there were
approximately 149 other section 1983 cases decided by summary
order, probably all of which were affirmances. Thus, the total
number of Section 1983 cases decided during the year was
approximately 213, out of approximately 1724 cases briefed during
the year. This would represent over 12% of the court's docket.
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I. STATISTICAL OVERVIEW
The total number of section 1983 opinions found was 64. The
cotirt -reversed wholly or partially in 35 cases and affirmed
completely in 29. If you factor in the approximately 149
summary-order affirmances this would produce an overall reversal
rate-of about 16.4%.
Plaintiffs appealed in 49 of the opinion cases (76%), defendants
in 15 (23%). Plaintiffs prevailed in 27 cases (42%), defendants in
37(58%).
A. WHO WAS SUING?
PRISONERS: 12 cases (19%)
CITIZENS ARRESTED OR PROSECUTED: 8 cases (13%).
EMPLOYEES: 8 cases (12%), including claims of retaliation,
due process, and discrimination.
PROPERTY AND BUSINESS OWNERS: 10 cases (15%)
PHYSICIANS: 3 cases (5%)
OTHERS: 26 cases (40%). Plaintiffs in this miscellaneous
category included such diverse parties as students, taxpayers,
contractors, and tenants.
B. WHO WERE THE DEFENDANTS?
By and large, the defendants are the ones to be expected
opposing the various types of plaintiffs-police, corrections
officers, municipal employers, school boards and officials, and
zoning authorities.
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C. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
Procedural issues were prominent, sometimes dispositive,
in 17 cases (26%):
Appealability: Tolbert.
Collateral estoppel and resjudicata: Hickerson and Doe.
Standing- Gregg and Latino Officers Association.
Pleading- Johnson, Car, and Jones.
Evidence: Catone.
Discovery: Okunieff and McPherson.
Jurisdiction: Murray and Hachamouitch
Inconsistent verdicts: Turley
Retroactivity of PLRA: Salahuddin
Abstention: Dittmer
Mootness: Knaust .
Ten of the appeals (15%) were taken from judgments entered
after trial. Summary judgments accounted for 24 (37%), and 7.
(10%) involved dismissals under rule 12(b)(6). 7 appeals (10%)
were from preliminary injunction orders. Denial of immunity was
the basis for 9 interlocutory appeals (14%),
Of the 64 cases, 46 (72%) were heard by panels on which one of
the three judges was a "visiting judge", either from one of the
district courts in the second circuit or from a district or circuit court
outside the circuit. Only 4 of the 64 opinions were written by
visiting judges. These statistics still reflect the extraordinary
burdens placed on the judges of the circuit as a result of the four
vacancies on the court that prevailed through a good part of the
year. To ease those burdens the court necessarily sought help from
visitors. Fortunately, all but one of the vacancies has now been
filled and the circuit will have less need to call on visiting judges.
The year involved 7 (11%) First Amendment cases.
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Prisoner litigation continues to command considerable attention
from the Second Circuit. The trend of an increasing number of
cases filed by pro se appellants seems to be continuing. Nine of the
circuit court's opinions in these section 1983 cases were written
-where thetapje1lant-was apr-o s litigant., Covington, :Carr, Grieg,
Grune, Hawkins, Johnson, McPherson, Montero, and Walker. In
four of them, Covington, Grieg, McPherson, and Walker, the pro
se's were successful, continuing from last year the rather
remarkable improvement in the quality of litigation coming out of
our prisons.
III. OPINIONS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE
Some of the Second Circuit's opinions deserve special comment
because of their new or unusual rulings.
Amato v. City of Saratoga, 170 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1999). The
circuit court considered bifurcation of the trial of police officers
from that of the municipality in a police brutality claim. Section
1983 actions are well suited to bifurcation. Even though plaintiff
recovered only nominal damages in first trial, he was still "entitled
to seek symbolic vindication from the municipality for violation of
constitutional rights." Dismissal of the claim against the
municipality because plaintiff could recover only nominal damages
was error.
Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d
Cir. 1998). As a matter of first impression, the Second Circuit
decided, on a claim of sexual harassment of a school child by other
children, that Title IX subsumed possible claims under section
1983, either to enforce Title IX or to protect equal protection rights
directly. Thus Second Circuit joined Third and Seventh Circuits in
denying relief under § 1983, and departed from the Sixth, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits.
Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F3d 74 (2d Cir. 1998). In a case
where the operator of a topless bar claimed harassment by
municipal officials, the second circuit ikterpreted Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 US 299 (1996), to require a 1983 plaintiff to plead
[Vol 16230
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a violation of clearly established law, and entertained an appeal
from a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on qualified immunity
grounds. The circuit court considered the city's interest in
gathering information about the impact of topless bars on the
neighborhood as possibly justifying defendants' establishment of
surveillance cameras at plaintiff's premises. However, because
issues were so confused in the "profoundly equivocal and
repetitive" complaint, the circuit court remanded with permission
to the district court to require an amended complaint, or conduct
discovery, or both, and then reconsider the qualified immunity
issue. It also said the qualified immunity issue could be appealed
again.
Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999).
Considering the interaction of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 US 477
(1994) with the statute of limitations on a false arrest claim, the
circuit court held that if success on the plaintiff's section 1983
claim would necessarily have implied the invalidity of any
conviction which may have resulted from the state criminal
proceedings relating to the arrest (such as when the only evidence
to convict resulted from a search incident to the challenged arrest),
then the false arrest claim would not accrue, for limitations
purposes, until after the criminal prosecution was dismissed.
Doe v. Pfromner, 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998). The circuit court
concluded that the district court's sua sponte application of
collateral estoppel to unreviewed decision of Administrative Law
Judge was not error.
Dittmer v. County of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998). In a
facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Long Island Pine
Barrens Protection Act, the circuit court concluded that the district
court abused its discretion in dismissing on grounds of Burford and
Colorado River abstentions.
McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d (2d Cir. 1999). Continuing the
trend to provide special protections to pro se litigants, the circuit
court adopted a principle that summary judgment may not be
5
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granted against a pro se litigant unless there is a clear indication
that he or she "understands the nature and consequences of Rule
56... [H]e or she must be so informed by the movant in the notice
of motion or, failing that, by the district court."
Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1998). Despite the
Supreme Court's directive that before reaching the issue of
qualified immunity a court should first decide that there was a
1.iolation of a constitutional right, Siegert v. Gilley, 500 US 226
(1991), the circuit court found the novel question of whether a
retaliatory entrapment by a district attorney violated first
amendment rights to be unclear, but held that whatever the
contours of such a right might be, they were not yet clearly
established, so qualified immunity applied.
Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999). Without
discussing the dubious concept of pendent party appellate
jurisdiction, the circuit court dismissed the complaint against a
Town on the interlocutory, qualified- immunity appeal of its police
officer.
IV. ALPHABETICAL SUMMARY OF CIVIL RIGHTS
OPINIONS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT WITH FULL
CITATIONS JUNE 1, 1998 TO MAY 31,1999
Amato v. City of Saratoga, 170 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 1998). Jury
finding of excessive force in a section 1983 actin against law
enforcement officials does not automatically entitle claimant to
compensatory damages as a matter of law. Nominal damages
award against individual officers does not preclude a trial against
the municipality, which had been bifurcated.
Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1998). An inmate who was
not provided substantial assistance, and who was deprived of his
right to call witnesses in a Tier III disciplinary hearing may have
had his due process rights violated. No qualified immunity
because rights were clearly established.
232 [Vol 16
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Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1998); Court
construes impact of Prison Litigation Reform Act on several
consent decrees entered in the 1970's with respect to prison
conditions.
Blissettv. Casey, 147 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1998). Where prisoner's
attorneys performed services (in part) before PLRA became
effective, PLRA's restrictions did not apply. Court rejects
argument that PLRA's fee limitation should be applied to all
awards of fees made after the effective date.
Breen v. Garrison, 169 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 1998). Issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment on false arrest and
excessive force claims. Dismissal of criminal charge because of
facial insufficiency was not a dismissal on the merits; malicious
prosecution claim was properly dismissed.
Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998);
Availability of remedy under Title IX precludes relief to female
plaintiff under section 1983 for sexual harassment by fellow
students, either to enforce Title IX or rights under equal protection
clause. Agrees with CA3 and CA7; disagrees with CA6, CA8,
and CA10.
Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 1999). Statute requiring
district courts to screen prisoner's civil actions against government
officials applied regardless of whether prisoner was proceeding in
forma pauperis or paid filing fees.
Catone v. Spielmann, 149 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 1998). Qualified
immunity for dismissal without a due process hearing depended on
whether plaintiff was a deputy, which presented contested issues of
fact. Appeal dismissed.
Charette v. Town of Oyster Bay, 159 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998).
Disputed factual issues rendered denial of preliminary injunction to
a topless bar an abuse of discretion. Remanded for evidentiary
A----
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hearing as to whether municipal regulation imposed a
constitutional violation and whether there was irreparable harm.
Connell v. Signoracci, 153 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1998). Police
officer, who is prohibited from owning taverns, cannot claim
violation of his first amendment right to free expression in
connection with topless dancing performed at bars. Court
considered qualified immunity on motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), and authorized-a.second immunity motion.
Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999).
False arrest claim does not accrue for statute of limitations
purposes until dismissal of underlying criminal charges, if success
on plaintiffs false arrest claim, would necessarily imply the
invalidity of a possible conviction resulting from the criminal
proceeding. This case relied on Heck v. Humphrey.
Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1998). Pro se prisoner who
brings a section 1983 action should have opportunity for discovery
to determine who is responsible for retaliatory transfer, before case
can be dismissed for lack of participation in transfer by the named
defendant.
DeMichele v. Greenbugh Central School District No 7, 167 F.3d
784 (2d Cir. 1998). There is no denial of due process in
prosecuting the disciplinary hearing of a teacher 24 years after the
events, when teacher shows no prejudice from the delay.
Deshawn v. Safir, 156 F:3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998). It is not a
violation of rights merely to question without Miranda warnings;
violation does not occur until information is sought to be used in
court proceedings.
Diamond Stone v. Macaluso, 148 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998). The
fact that on a prior traffic stop plaintiff refused to produce proof of
insurance did not provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause
two months later for subsequent traffic stops for lack of insurance.
234 [Vol 16
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Dittmer v. County of Suffolk, 146 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1998).
District court's dismissal on abstention grounds of landowners'
challenge to facial constitutionality of L.I. Pine Barrens Protection
Act was not supported by either Burford or Colorado River
doctrines.
DLC Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124
(2d Cir. 1998). Real property owner did not have substantive due
process right in existing zoning of property, because owner's rights
in existing classification were not vested under New York law.
Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998). Client was not
required to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing a
section 1983 claim challenging agency's alleged failure to provide
him with adequate IWRP (Individualized Written Rehabilitation
Program). Decision of ALJ collaterally estops plaintiff's claim
here.
Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d 858 (2d Cir. 1998). If district
court disallows attorney's fees for particular items of work, it,
should state specifically the reasons why they are not awarded so
as to allow for meaningful appellate review. Opinion includes a
detailed analysis of prejudgment interest and attorney's fee issues.
Greenwood v. State, Office of Mental Health, 163 F.3d 119 (2d
Cir. 1998). Clinical staff privileges guaranteed by state law at a
state hospital are a property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause. For qualified immunity, interest was clearly established
even though CA2 had not directly ruled on the point. Also, the
property interest satisfies the "plus" of the "stigma plus"
requirement so that there was also a deprivation of a liberty
interest, although that interest was not clearly established.
Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 1998). Litigants who file
prison condition actions after release are no longer "prisoners" for
purposes of exhaustion requirements of PLRA.
9
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Grune v. Rodriguez, 176 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1999). Plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendants acted with more than mere
negligence. Prisoner's claims against parole officials were rejected
for various reasons.
Gubitosi v."*ctica, 154TF.3d 30 (2d Cir. 1998). When plaintiff,
on summary judgment immunity motion, failed to present evidence
that police chief engaged in first amendment retaliation, qualified
immunity protected police chief.
Gudema v. Nassau County, 163 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1998).
Neither a warrant nor probable cause is required when a
governmental entity conducts a reasonable search acting in its
capacity as employer rather than law enforcer. Plaintiff in a
procedural due process claim based on a random, unauthorized act,
must show under Parratt v. Taylor that there is no adequate state
remedy.
Hachamovitch v. Debuono, 159 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 1998).
Because physicians' challenge to state rule precluding the
reopening of disciplinary hearing for newly discovered evidence
raises due process concerns, Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar
federal jurisdiction; nor does Burford abstention.
Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Service Care, 163 F.3d 684 (2d Cir.
1998). Pro se attorney is not entitled to attorney's fee under
section 1988, notwithstanding that she proceeded pro se due to
necessity.
Hickerson v. City of New York, 146 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1998). In a
case challenging zoning restrictions on adult entertainment
establishments, plaintiffs who had the opportunity to litigate
identical issues in state court, are collaterally estopped from
bringing suit in federal court. England reservation is not available
to plaintiffs who initially brought suit in state court and, after
removal to federal court, sought a remand to state court.
Home v. Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1998). Qualified
immunity granted because law was not r learly established that
236 [Vol 16
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prison officials have to provide mentally retarded inmates with
"counsel substitute" for disciplinary hearing.
Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1999). A section 1983
suit brought by a prisoner challenging the validity of a disciplinary
or administrative sanction that does not affect the overall length of
his confinement, is not barred by Heck and Edwards.
Johnson v. Morgenthau, 160 F.3d 897 (2d Cir. 1998). Claim of
pro se section 1983 plaintiff survives his death. Appeal dismissed
without prejudice to reinstatement on application of decedent's
representative.
Jones v. NYS Div. of Military and Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45 (2d
Cir. 1998). Eleventh amendment bars Major's claim of improper
reassignment by N.Y. National Guard. Because plaintiff failed to
exhaust the National Guard's procedures for appealing
discretionary decisions, district court was correct in denying the
plaintiff's motion to amend complaint and to add individual
defendants.
Kessler v.Grand Cent. Dist. Management Ass'n, Inc., 158 F.3d
92 (2d Cir. 1998). Deviations from one-person one-vote are
subject to close scrutiny. Because a NYC Business Improvement
District is created only for a special limited purpose and has a
disproportionate effect on certain constituents, its weighted-voting
provision is exempt from one-person one-vote requirement of the
equal protection clause.
King v. Town of Hempstead, 161 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
Federal Housing and Community Development Act, 42 USC
section 5301(c), designed to create affordable housing, does not
create a federal right enforceable under section 1983.
Knaust v. City of Kingston, NY, 157 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998). In
an action challenging federal funding of a local program,
preliminary injunction was denied on the ground of mootness.
11
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Koppell v. New York State Board of Elections, 153 F.3d 95 (2d
Cir. 1998). As long as state's system of ballot placement treats all
candidates in nondiscriminatory manner, there is no constitutional
right to preferred position on ballot. Lottery system for ballot
placement is constitutional.
Latino Officers Association v. Safir, 170 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1999).
Police officers' association had standing to challenge department's
procedure requiring advance permission to speak publicly on
police matters. Injunction reversed because officers are not likely
to succeed against requirements of permission and reporting on
speeches.
Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1998). Pickering
balancing of a public employee's right to freedom of speech
against the state's interest in promoting public concerns is an issue
of law for the court.
Marchi v. Board of Cooperative Educational Services Albany,
173 F.3d 469 (2d Cir. 1999). BOCES teacher could
constitutionally be prohibited from using religion and religious
references as part of his instructional program. School board had
legitimate interest in avoiding claims of establishment-clause
violations.
McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 1999). District
court cannot grand summary judgment against pro se litigant
unless there is in the record a clear indication that he understands
the nature and consequences. of Rule 56. He must be informed by
the movant in the notice of motion or, failing that, by the district
court.
Mederros v. O'Connell, 150 F.3d 16 (2d Cir. 1998). Accidental
shooting of hostage is not a seizure within the meaning of the 4th
amendment.
Million Youth March, Inc. v. Safir, 155 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 1998).
Any parade permit scheme that controls the time, place and
manner of speech must not be based on -)ntent of message but
238 [Vol 16
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instead based on governmental interests. However, when denial of
permit is unconstitutional, court need not grand the precise relief
requested by plaintiff, but should adapt its injunction to the
circumstances.
Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999). Absolute
immunity against 1983 actions afforded officials acting in a
judicial capacity extends to N.Y. parole commissioner when
granting, denying, or revoking parole.
Murray v. McDonald, 157 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1998). As long as
state courts give a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy for
constitutional tax claims, Tax Injunction Act bars federal-court
jurisdiction.
Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 1999).
Denying building permit does not violate substantive due process
unless municipality's is "so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute
a gross abuse of government authority." Plaintiff failed to
establish a "federally protected property right" in the permits
applied for.
Okunieffv. Rosenburg, 166 F.3d 507 (2d Cir. 1998). Involuntary
commitment to private hospital is not state action.
Pikulin v. City University of New York, 176 F.3d 598 (2d Cir.
1999). CUNY's entitlement to 11 th amendment immunity depends
on extent of supervision exercised by the state and whether the
state must satisfy a judgment against CUNY. Statute requirin.A
indemnification of CUNY's officers is not enough to establish 11
amendment immunity. Remanded to develop fuller record.
Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999). Claims based
on disclosure in prison of plaintiffs HIV status and
transsexualism. Held, there is a constitutional right to privacy re
both, and it is protected in the prison context, but since it was not
clearly established, qualified immunity for the privacy claim. On
8th amendment claim, disclosure of the status may expose plaintiff
13
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to violent conduct by other inmates, and no qualified immunity
here.
Prestia v. O'Connor, 178 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1999). New York
E3lections Law, which rquires .5% or. 1250 signatures for
designating petitions, when viewed in light of the state's overall
election scheme, does not preclude viable candidates or write-in
campaigns, and therefore does not violate 1st or 14th amendment.
Robinson v. Cattaraugus County, 147 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
Weight of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal. Punitive
damages may be based on nominal damages.
Rodriguez by Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 162 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 1998).
Whether 42 USC section 1396a(a)(10)(B) provides an enforceable
right of action pursuant to Sec. 1983, does not implicate subject
matter jurisdiction. It presents a question of whether the plaintiff
has stated a claim for relief.
Salahuddin v. Mead, 174 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1999). District court
improperly applied the exhaustion requirement of the amended
Sec. 1997e(a) to an action that was pending as of the effective date
of the PLRA.
Scott v. Albury, 156 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1998). In performing the
required analysis under Sandin v. Conner to determine if a
prisoner's liberty interest is implicated, a court should look at
actual penalty imposed at disciplinary hearing and not at the
maximum penalty that coufd be imposed.
Seneca Nation of Indians v. State of New York, 178 F.3d 95 (2d
Cir. 1999). The lth amendment does not bar Indian Tribe's
claims against the state when U.S. has intervened, asserting the
same claims for relief.
Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999). There was
sufficient evidence of probable cause to issue warrant, even if the
omitted exculpatory evidence had been before the magistrate
240 [Vol 16
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/5
2000 SECTION 1983 OPIMIONS IN THE 241
SECOND CIRCUIT
judge. Therefore, there was no constitutional violation and the
complaint should be dismissed against the officer and the town.
Smith v. Garretto, 147 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 1998). Prosecutor who
orchestrated bribery sting operation in retaliation for plaintiff's
exercise of free speech rights was not entitled to absolute
immunity, but was entitled to qualified immunity.
Sullivan v. County of Suffolk, 174 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 1999). DSS
was entitled to satisfaction of its medicaid lien before a
supplemental needs trust was funded from proceeds of settlement
of plaintiff's § 1983 excessive -force action.
Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1998). Issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment as to whether the police
officer used excessive force in arrest of the plaintiff.
Tolbert v. Queens College, 164 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
Generally, refusal to grant summary judgment based on qualified
immunity is immediately appealable. However, where court has.
denied summary judgment because resolution of the immunity
defense requires adjudication of issues of fact that are inseparable
from the merits, appeal is not immediate and must be dismissed.
Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999). Police
lacked qualified immunity for unconstitutional stop and search of
taxicab, a search that led to discovery of guns and drugs. But
plaintiff is not entitled to damages for the subsequent criminal trial,
conviction (later vacated), and incarceration, because (1) he did not
claim malicious prosecution, and (2) he conceded that he was not
seeking damages for an unreasonable search. The fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine is not available to assist a section 1983
plaintiff.
Turley v. Police Department of the City of New York, 167 F. 3d
757 (2d Cir. 1998). NYC's licensing scheme for street musicians
was upheld over claims of excessive fee, discrimination in favor of
15
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government-sponsored musicians, impermissible discretion in
police officers, and illegal confiscation of amplifiers of violators.
Walker v. Jastremski, 159 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1998). Whether
statute of limitations for a pro se prisoner alleging malicious
prosecution ray- be :tolted-for'the amount of time 'between the time
plaintiff requests record and the time he receives record on the
ground that it was impossible for plaintiff to get to the courthouse,
should be considered after district court determines whether the
additional time from tolling would make the claim viable.
Warner v. Orange County Dept. of Probation, 173 F.3d 120 (2d
Cir. 1999). Mandatory attendance in Alcohol Anonymous as a
condition of probation may violate probationer's first amendment
establishment clause right. No waiver here. $1.00 nominal
damages.
Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Department, 176 F.3d 25 (2d
Cir. 1999). Probationary police officer's claim of retaliation by
commissioner failed for lack of proof of personal involvement or
of a municipal policy or custom.
Young v. County of Fulton, 160 F.3d 899 (2d Cir. 1998).
Individual defendants get qualified immunity because at time
mother placed her children into foster care there was no clearly
established federal right to pretermination hearing before
suspension of her visitation rights. Violation of state requirement
for a pretermination hearing does not give rise to a section 1983
claim. No failure to train- claim against municipality because
deliberate indifference requires that the right be clearly established.
242 [Vol 16
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